The Importance of Culture in Emic Interpretations of the History of Thailand’s Southern Separatist Movement: The “Gentlemen’s Agreement” of 1943 and the Malaysian Relationship with the Separatists by Otto F. von Feigenblatt
     
 
     
     
 
     
     
 
     
      Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences  ( 2010) Vol 2, No 1, 46-56       
 
46 
 
The Importance of Culture in Emic 
Interpretations of the History of Thailand’s 
Southern Separatist Movement: The 
“Gentlemen’s Agreement” of 1943 and the 
Malaysian Relationship with the Separatists 
 
Otto von Feigenblatt, Nova Southeastern University                           
(Fort Lauderdale, Florida) 
 
 
Abstract: This paper explores the role of culture in two important events 
in the history of the separatist struggle in the Muslim South of Thailand. 
The  first  event  was  the  “gentlemen’s  agreement”  of  1943,  promising 
Britain’s  support for  independence or annexation  to  British Malaya  in 
exchange  of  military  and  intelligence  support  against  the  Japanese, 
between the traditional Melayu leadership and the British Colonial Office 
represented  by  the  commander  of  the  British  forces  in  Malaya  during 
World War II.  Emic and etic explanations are provided from the point of 
view of the Melayu leardership and of the British. The second event that is 
discussed  is  more  complex  and  involves  Malaysia’s  support  for  the 
separatist  movement  and  subsequent  negotiations  during  the  1980s 
between Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur leading to an agreement stipulating 
that Malaysia would cease aiding the separatist movement in exchange of 
Thailand’s  support  against  the  Communist  Party  of  Malaya  along  the 
porous  Thai-Malay  border.  Finally,  a  brief  conclusion  summarizes  the 
importance  of  culture  in  the  history  of  the  separatist  movement  of 
Southern Thailand. 
Keywords: Thailand, Malaysia, Separatist Movements, Ethnonationalism 
1. Introduction 
 
The  three  border  provinces  of  the  Thai  South,  Yala, 
Narathiwat,  and  Pattani,  are  predominantly  inhabited  by 
Muslim Malays, also known as Melayu Patani due to their 
Malay dialect. Historically, they were part of the independent 
Kingdom of Patani and during the 16th century represented 
the  height  of  Muslim  Civilization  in  Southeast  Asia  (Yegar 
2002;  Roux  1998).  The  rise  of  the  unified  Kingdom  of 
Ayutthaya and later on of Siam to the North was followed by      
 
     
     
 
     
      Otto von Feigenblatt, Nova Southeastern University                           
(Fort Lauderdale, Florida) 
 
 
 
     
 
47 
 
military  incursions  to  the  Southern  Muslim  Malay 
Sultanates  (Wyatt  2003).  A  loose  relationship  of  vassalage 
was  established  by  King  Rama  I  and  maintained  with  few 
changes  until  the  ascent  to  the  throne  of  Siam  by  King 
Chulalongkorn,  Rama  V  in  the  late  19th  century  (McCargo 
2009).  Chulalongkorn’s  drastic  modernization  program 
included  the  centralization  of  the  administration  of  the 
kingdom  and  led  to  the  first  attempts  at  the  direct 
administration  of  the  Malay  Sultanates  of  Patani, 
Terengganu,  and  Perlis  (Yegar  2002).1 The  centralization  of 
administration  was  resisted  by  the  Malay  Muslims  in  the 
South  and  their  traditional  leaders  were  tolerated  by  the 
Central Government until the early 20th century when direct 
administration  by  Thai  bureaucrats  was  imposed  by 
Bangkok  and  traditional  leaders  were  left  with  only  a 
ceremonial position (Roux 1998; Yegar 2002).2  
  World War II provided an opportunity for the Melayu 
Patani  to  seek  outside  help  in  order  to  reestablish  their 
autonomy  and  possibly  their  independence  from  the  Thai 
Central  Government.  Since  Thailand  had  joined  the  axis 
powers  and  supported  the  Japanese,  the  Melayu  of  the 
South  decided  to  support  the  British  forces  of  British 
Malaya. The British made good use of them as fighters and 
in  providing  intelligence  about  the  Japanese.  Traditional 
leaders, lead by  Tunku Mayhiddin, brokered an agreement 
with  the  British  Commander  which  stipulated  that  in 
exchange of military and intelligence support by the Malay 
Muslims of the South of Thailand, the British would support 
their  independence  from  Thailand  or  at  least  their 
annexation to British Malaya after the end of the War (Yegar 
2002).  
  After  the  end  of  the  War,  the  British  decided  not  to 
annex  Patani  and  Satun  in  order  to  avoid  destabilizing 
Thailand. Needless to say, the traditional leadership of the 
South of Thailand felt betrayed and after the independence 
                                                 
1 Perlis and Terengganu were annexed by British Malaya after the Anglo-
Siamese Treaty of 1909. Patani was recognized as part of Siam. 
2 The last ruling Sultan of Patani, Tunku Abdul Kader, escaped to Malaya 
in 1932 after the Coup ending the absolute Monarchy in Siam.      
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of Malaysia it was supported by relatives in Malaysia such as 
the  royal  family  of  Kelantan,  inter  alia  (Millard  2004).  The 
conflict between the Malaysian Federal government and the 
Communist Party of Malaya, during the 1960s and 1970s, 
complicated the relationship between Malaysia and the Thai 
South  (Neher  2002).  Communist  forces  operated  along  the 
porous Thai-Malysian border and were tolerated by the Thai 
authorities  (Smith  2005).  The  Thai  Government  used  the 
communist  threat  as  negotiating  leverage  to  convince  the 
Malaysian  Government  to  stop  supporting  the  separatist 
movement in the South. Kelantan continued to support the 
rebels  while  the  Federal  Government  ceased  to  do  so. 
Pressure  mounted  and  even  Kelantan  was  restricted  from 
aiding the separatists (Smith 2005; Jory 2007; Liow 2006). 
  Both of the previously described events were pivotal in 
the  history  of  the  separatist  movement  in  the  South  of 
Thailand.  The  following  sections  provide  etic  and  emic 
interpretations of the events so as to bring to the fore the 
role of culture in the wider context of the unrest in the Deep 
South of Thailand. Nevertheless, the issues are complex and 
the  parties  are  not  monolithic  entities  and  therefore  the 
explanations provided are exploratory in nature rather than 
conclusive. 
 
2. The “Gentlemen’s Agreement” of World War II 
  During the early stages of the Japanese occupation of 
Thailand and later Malaya the situation for the allied forces 
was dire (Neher 2002). Manpower was limited and logistical 
and  intelligence  support  was  badly  needed  by  the  British 
forces operating in Malaya (2002). The traditional leaders of 
the  Melayu  Malay  community    of  the  South  of  Thailand 
decided to side with the British in exchange for support for 
independence or annexation to British Malaya at the end of 
the War. Malay Muslims in the South of Thailand cooperated 
with  British  forces  by  providing  food,  shelter,  logistical 
support, fighting men, and intelligence (Yegar 2002). Several 
sources mention an important oral agreement between the 
traditional  leader  of  the  Melayu  Patani,  Tunku  Mayhiddin, 
the son of the last Sultan, and the Commander of the British      
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forces  in  Malaya,  representing  the  Colonial  Office.  While 
there is no documentary evidence of the agreement, several 
witnesses  have  come  forward  to  attest  that  the  encounter 
between the two leaders took place and that British support 
for  independence  or  at  least  secession  from  Thailand  was 
promised in exchange for the aforementioned support (Yegar 
2002; Ungpakorn 2007; Gunaratna and Acharya 2006). As 
was mentioned in the introduction, British support for the 
independence of greater Patani was not forthcoming and the 
region  was  recognized  to  be  sovereign  territory  of  the 
Kingdom of Thailand (Ishii 1994).  
  How  to  interpret  the  event?  First  a  standard  etic 
explanation  will  be  provided  which  will  then  be 
complemented  with  two  emic  interpretations.  During  the 
early stage of the War, the British forces needed the help of 
the Malays in order to defend the dwindling territory under 
their control. Furthermore, the Pacific theater of the war was 
not a priority at the time and most decisions were taken by 
local commanders based on the particular circumstances of 
the  situation.  Therefore  the  British  commander  took  the 
opportunity  to  cement  an  alliance  for  pragmatic  reasons. 
After the war, the main priority of the British and the allies 
was to have a stable Thailand at the center of Southeast Asia 
and  geopolitical  considerations  trumped  any  other 
considerations. The lack of a written agreement provided an 
expedient excuse for breaching the previous understanding 
between the parties. 
  While  the  previous  etic  standard  explanation  seems 
plausible  it  is  far  from  exhaustive  and  leaves  important 
ideational  and  cultural  aspects  out.  An  emic  interpretation 
from  the  perspective  of  the  Malay  leadership  is  that  the 
British entered a formal agreement based on honor between 
the representative of Great Britain, the British Commander, 
and  the  leader  of  the  Melayu  Patani  nation,  Tunku 
Mayhiddin.  According  to  them  the  agreement  was  later 
breached  by  the  British  due  to  selfish  considerations  and 
this  is  considered  a  dishonorable  betrayal.  On  the  other 
hand a British interpretation of the event greatly differs from 
the previous one. According to the British the agreement was 
provisional  in  nature  due  to  its  oral  nature.  Moreover,  the      
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British Commander did not have the authority to make such 
an agreement in any case nor did the Colonial Office. Since 
the  agreement  was  merely  a  provisional  “gentlemen’s 
agreement”  then  it  was  not  legally  binding  on  the  British 
Government.  The  need  to  have  a  stable  Thailand  trumped 
the need for self determination.  
  Several  cultural  factors  are  important  in  the  emic 
explanations  previously  presented.  It  is  clear  that  the  two 
parties  viewed  the  value  of  an  oral  agreement  differently 
(Nisbett 2003). In addition to that, the perceived powers of 
the British Commander also differed. Finally, the underlying 
assumption  of  pragmatism  in  diplomacy  was  an  issue 
(Murdock 1955). At the risk of oversimplification, it can be 
asserted  that  traditional  Malay  aristocrats,  such  as  the 
leaders who negotiated the agreement with the British, held 
in equal respect written and oral agreements (Nisbett 2003; 
Mulder 1996). Moreover, they assumed that a Commander 
had the same power as a traditional Malay leader to enter 
into  binding  agreements.  Both  assumptions  proved  to  be 
incorrect. Thus while culture cannot be considered the sole 
explanatory  factor  in  the  breach  of  the  “gentlemen’s 
agreement”,  it  complements  etic  neo-realist  explanations 
based  on  blanket  assumptions  of  actor  self-interest  and 
perfect rationality. 
 
3. Malaysia’s Relationship to the Separatist 
Movement 
   
The  second  “event”  that  will  be  discussed  is  not  a 
discreet  one-time  event  but  rather  a  trend  in  a  long  term 
relationship punctuated by several major agreements. There 
is a very close socio-cultural relationship between the three 
border provinces of the South of Thailand and the northern 
Malay Sultanates of the Federation of Malaysia (Jory 2007; 
Liow 2006, 2006; Roux 1998). Furthermore, the three border 
provinces share a common language and religion with them. 
Even the royal families of the Sultanate of Kelantan and of 
Patani  are  closely  blood  related.  Nevertheless  the  initially 
high  support  provided  by  Malaysia  to  the  separatist 
movement  in  the  South  of  Thailand,  of  the  early  post-     
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independence period gradually gave way to a policy of non-
interference in the 1970s and 1980s.  
  Why did Malaysia’s support for the rebels decline over 
the  years?  A  statist  explanation  to  the  previous  question 
based  on  realism  would  assert  that  Malaysia  stopped 
supporting  them  when  their  cost-benefit  analysis  made 
support for them too costly. More specifically, the rise of the 
threat of communism in Southeast Asia in the late 60s and 
70s made military cooperation with Thailand more important 
than the promotion of self determination (Askew 2007; Liow 
2006). Thus the pragmatic support of the rebels during the 
early  post-independence  years  was  an  attempt  to  balance 
power by weakening Thailand while the change in policy was 
due to the need to fight the threat posed by the Communist 
Party of Malaya (Askew 2007; Neher 2002). From a security 
perspective, Thailand was ignoring the troops of the CPM in 
its  side  of  the  border  as  long  as  they  did  not  attack  Thai 
targets  and  due  to  sovereignty  Malaysian  forces  were  not 
allowed  to  pursue  them  into  Thai  territory  (Yegar  2002; 
Askew  2007).  Thailand  used  the  threat  of  the  CPM  as 
leverage so as to convince the Malaysian government to stop 
supporting the separatists. 
  The previous explanation assumes that the parties are 
unitary  actors,  operating  under  perfect  rationality,  and 
motivated by self interest (Cozette 2008; Tang 2008; Hazen 
2008). Avruch criticizes this “sealed black box” assumption 
and recommends including a nuanced cultural analysis into 
the picture (1998). Firstly, Malaysia was not a unitary actor 
in  the  relationship  in  discussion.  As  a  Federation,  the 
individual Sultanates have considerable autonomy and their 
own  political  leaders.  It  is  also  important  to  mention  that 
Kelantan  and  Trengganu,  both  under  the  control  of  an 
Islamic political party, Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, continued to 
support  the  separatists  even  after  the Federal  Government 
decided  to  stop  doing  so  (Askew  2007;  Yegar  2002). 
Moreover,  there  are  considerable  cultural  differences 
between the Northern Malay Sultanates and the rest of the 
Federation (Millard 2004). For example, the dialect spoken in 
the  Northern  Malay  States  is  closer  to  the  one  spoken  in 
Southern  Thailand  (Roux  1998).  In  addition  to  that,  the      
 
     
     
 
     
      The Importance of Culture in Emic Interpretations of the History of Thailand’s Southern 
Separatist Movement: The “Gentlemen’s Agreement” of 1943 and the Malaysian 
Relationship with the Separatists 
 
     
             
 
52 
 
Northern Sultanates are more religiously conservative than 
the rest of the country (Millard 2004).  
  An emic explanation of the change in the relationship 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  separatists  would  take  those 
cultural  factors  into  consideration.  For  example,  the  close 
relationship  between  the  Sultan  of  Kelantan  and  the 
traditional  leadership  of  Patani  would  be  emphasized.  It 
could even be asserted that Kelantan has more in common 
with  Patani  than  with  other  Malaysian  Sultanates  (Millard 
2004).  Thus,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  separatists 
Kelantan supported them due to their close ties in term of 
kinship, cultural affinity, and common history of oppression 
under  the  Siamese  (Yegar  2002).  The  change  would  be 
interpreted as pressure from the secular leadership in Kuala 
Lumpur  and  the  weaker  socio-cultural  links  between  the 
people of Patani and those of the rest of Malaysia.  An emic 
explanation  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  leadership  of 
Kelantan  would  be  very  similar  to  the  one  of  the  Melayu 
Patani.  
  A  proper  etic  explanation  of  the  change  in  the 
relationship between Malaysia and the separatist movement 
should  take  into  consideration  realist  factors  such  as 
security  in  addition  to  cultural  factors.  Internal  political 
factors  are  also  important,  such  as  the  difference  between 
the political culture of the northern Sultanates and the rest 
of the Federation (Millard 2004). Therefore a more nuanced 
explanation of the change in the relationship would attempt 
to open the “black box” assumed by realist scholars and look 
at  internal  cultural  variation  as  well  as  commonalities 
(Avruch 1998; Shani 2008; Kessler 2009).  
 
4. Conclusions 
  The two “events” discussed in this paper were used to 
explore the role of culture in conflict. Culture was used as a 
complementary  explanatory  variable  in  order  to  emphasize 
the  emic  interpretations  of  events.  Etic  explanations  in  the 
realist tradition tend to omit culture as a valid concern and 
give  primacy  to  control  over  resources  and  hard  power 
(Guilhot 2008; Kolodziej 2005).  The situation in traditional      
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security  studies  is  no  different  from  that  found  in 
international relations. Traditional Security paradigms tend 
to give primacy to the security of the state at the expense of 
other actors and take a narrow view of the factors that can 
be considered important (David Carment 2009; Khong 2006; 
Abulof 2009).  
  The  unrest  in  the Deep  South  of  Thailand  is  a  good 
example of an ethno-national conflict that has been mostly 
analyzed  through  the  traditional  lenses  of  international 
relations  and  security  studies  (Ungpakorn  2007;  McCargo 
2004). Geopolitical factors such as the balance of power in 
Southeast  Asia  and  the  rise  of  communism  have  been 
emphasized and local cultural grievances and basic human 
needs from the point of view of the Muslim Malay population 
of the region, have been ignored (Jitpiromrisi and McCargo 
2008).  The  recent  surge  in  violence  shows  that  the  root 
causes of the conflict have not been addressed by Bangkok 
and that a new more holistic approach is needed. Cultural 
insecurity on the part of the population of the Deep South is 
at the root of the violence and thus a proper inquiry as to the 
root  of  that  cultural  insecurity  should  be  undertaken  and 
the findings must be properly integrated in to any possible 
policy  interventions  (Jitpiromrisi  and  McCargo  2008; 
Ungpakorn 2007; Liow 2006).  
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